Background

Iran May Have Enough Low-Enriched Uranium for Up to Seven Nuclear Weapons

The new IAEA report was prepared for next month’s IAEA Board of Governors meeting to be held in Vienna September 10-14. The report shows continuing increased Iranian production of low-enriched uranium. Based on the new IAEA report, LIGNET assesses that Iran now has enough low-enriched uranium to make six to seven nuclear weapons if this uranium is further enriched to weapons grade. 

To read the new Iran IAEA report, click HERE.

About 180 to 250 kg of uranium enriched to 20 percent U-235 is needed to make enough fuel for a nuclear weapon if further enriched to weapons grade (about 90 percent U-235). It takes about 1,000 kg of uranium enriched to 3 to 5 percent U-235 to make one weapon's worth of nuclear weapons fuel if enriched to weapons grade.  Experts believe Iran could enrich either uranium stockpile to weapons grade in two to six months.

The new IAEA report reflects a steady increase since 2009 in Iran’s potential capability to produce enough fuel for multiple nuclear weapons, as illustrated in the chart below.

A Major Increase in Iran’s Enriched Uranium Production Capability

More significant than the increase in Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile is what appears to be a stepped-up effort by Iranian officials to install more uranium centrifuges to enriched uranium in its Fordow enrichment facility. The Fordow plant is built into a mountainside and is believed to be heavily fortified to withstand Israeli and U.S. airstrikes. 

The Fordow plant contains centrifuges that are enriching uranium to the 19.75 percent U-235 level, a step closer to weapons-grade nuclear fuel. Iran claims this production is to fuel a reactor that produces medical isotopes. Western states and Israel reject this explanation and have made the suspension of uranium enrichment at Fordow a non-negotiable requirement in nuclear talks with Iran. Tehran, however, has refused to discuss suspending operations at Fordow.

The new IAEA report says Iran has doubled the number of uranium centrifuges at Fordow since May, from 1,064 to 2,140. This was a significant expansion given the short amount of time involved and the fact that this facility can only hold a total of 3,000 centrifuges. This makes it appear that Iran hopes to soon install the maximum number of these devices at Fordow, perhaps by the end of the year.

The IAEA reported that only 696 of the Fordow centrifuges were operating as of August 18, 2012 and could not confirm the status of centrifuges not yet operational. Iran so far has produced about 65 kg of uranium enriched to 20 percent U-235 at Fordow and about 121 kg at another facility. 

If Iran succeeds in putting its newly installed Fordow centrifuges into operation, it could substantially increase its stockpile of uranium enriched to the 20 percent level in a facility that could prove very difficult for the United States and Israel to destroy. 

Some experts believe the new U.S. 30,000-pound GBU-57B bunker buster bomb might be able to do substantial damage to the Fordow facility. Israel is not believed to have any of these bombs and they reportedly are too heavy to be carried by Israeli bombers. To read more about the GBU-57B bunker buster, see LIGNET’s August 1, 2012 analysis Iran Won’t be Cowed by New US ‘Bunker Buster’ Bomb.

Other Disturbing Findings

In its new report, the IAEA said that despite intensive dialogue since January with Iran to resolve several unanswered questions, the discussion yielded no real results and Iran has significantly hampered the IAEA’s efforts to inspect its nuclear facilities. Some of the report’s other findings included:

• Cover-up of Possible Nuclear Weapons Research at Parchin.  Iran continues to refuse to allow the IAEA to inspect the Parchin military base where Iran allegedly has conducted explosives testing suspected of being related to the development of a nuclear warhead. The IAEA noted that buildings have been removed from this base, significant ground scraping has taken place in the area, and satellite imagery indicates that a building where the alleged explosive testing was conducted has been shrouded, presumably to prevent it from being imaged by satellites.  (See photo below.)

• Work on Heavy Water Reactor Continues.  Iran continues to work on a heavy-water reactor near the city of Arak in defiance of IAEA and UN Security Council resolutions. When completed, this reactor will be capable of producing substantial amounts of plutonium. Iran claims the Arak heavy-water reactor will begin operations in the fall of 2013. Iran also is operating a plant to produce heavy water for the Arak reactor but has not allowed the IAEA to inspect it since August 2011. 

• IAEA Rejects Iran’s Explanation of Mysterious Finding of Uranium Enriched to 27 Percent.  Last May, the IAEA reported finding uranium particles enriched to 27 percent U-235. If confirmed, this finding could represent Iranian efforts to make nuclear fuel substantially beyond what it has declared and possibly an undeclared enrichment facility. Several analysts reacted cautiously to this finding, saying that it may represent a technical error. However, the IAEA provided a cryptic comment on this incident in its new report, saying that “with regard to the presence of particles with enrichment levels beyond 20% U-235, Iran’s explanation is not consistent with the further assessment made by the agency in the previous report.” While this comment does not necessarily indicate that the IAEA believes the May finding represented deliberate enrichment at higher levels and is not a technical error, this incident is another in a long list of unanswered questions about Iran’s nuclear program. 

Analysis

The new IAEA report suggests Iran has decided to significantly increase its capability to make nuclear weapons fuel in the heavily fortified Fordow facility despite strong Western pressure to halt operations at there. This action suggests, as LIGNET concluded in an August 24 analysis, that Iran either does not believe Israel will attack its nuclear facilities or that it believes it can withstand an attack and possibly use it to advance its interests. The sudden increase in centrifuges installed at Fordow since May in the midst of growing concern about Israeli airstrikes could indicate that Iran is positioning part of its nuclear program to withstand an Israeli attack.

The new IAEA report will strengthen the position of Israeli officials – especially Prime Minister Netanyahu – who are concerned that the West, especially the United States, has not been doing enough to stop the Iranian nuclear weapons program.  Netanyahu increased the pressure on Washington on September 2 when he called for the international community to set a “clear red line” to stop Iran’s nuclear program and demonstrate the world’s resolve.

Iran’s heavy water plant is another strong indication that it plans to substantially increase its capability to make large amounts of nuclear weapons fuel. The Arak heavy water reactor is a much more serious nuclear proliferation risk than Iran’s uranium enrichment program since this reactor would allow Iran to easily produce large amounts of plutonium, a more useful and lighter nuclear weapons fuel. However, despite Iran’s claim that the Arak reactor will be operational by fall 2013, LIGNET believes the technical challenges of completing this plant and producing sufficient heavy water means its actual start-up is several years in the future. 

LIGNET also believes that regardless of how many years away the Arak plant may be from start-up, Israel is certain to target this plant if it launches air strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities.

It is worth stressing that Iran’s installation of new centrifuge machinery at Fordow does not mean that most of this equipment will be operational in the near future. Iranian centrifuges have had high breakdown rates and Iran is experiencing increasing difficulties obtaining centrifuge parts due to international sanctions.  Moreover, Fordow’s centrifuges use a primitive Pakistani “P-1” design that is far less efficient than Western models and more prone to breakdown. Iran has been experimenting with more advanced centrifuge designs at other facilities with little success. 

Iran’s sudden installation of more centrifuges at Fordow could also be a bluff intended to pressure the West into making concessions. Iranian officials also often make exaggerated claims about their nuclear program and since they will not let IAEA officials inspect the internal workings of the Fordow machines, it is impossible to know whether they are close to being operational or are just empty shells. In any event, Iran is aware that the West and Israel know about its centrifuge build-up at Fordow and has factored this in to its nuclear and defense strategies.

Conclusion

The new IAEA report indicates Iran’s determination to move its uranium enrichment program underground so that it will survive Israeli airstrikes. This move may hasten the day when an Israeli attack cannot substantially set back Iran’s nuclear program, assuming the program has not already reached this point. The report also suggests Iran plans to substantially increase its capability to produce nuclear weapons fuel. These developments increase the chances of an Israeli airstrike and represent a serious failure of U.S. and European efforts to halt Iran’s nuclear program through diplomacy and stepped-up sanctions. 

Also check out:

Undercover In Iran: A Highly Placed LIGNET Source Pulls Back the Curtain
 (September, 1 2012)